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This paper uses example of Ukraine to explore the issue of
national airlines’ strategies on the global deregulated airline market.
Ukraine’s case is unusual in a sense that the country currently has
two main national carriers, which do not directly compete on any
international route. The carriers’ success on the global deregulated
market requires a well-established and structured network, which
none of the two carriers can offer at this time. We suggest that an
alliance between the two carriers is a preferable option to a merger.
The analysis is extended to suggest alliances as a possible policy
option on the deregulated airline markets. [JEL Classification: L20,
L93]
1. - Introduction
As new members of the European Union are reaping the fruits
of liberalisation of the EU’s airline market, and with further
liberalisation of the US-EU market well on its way; it is interesting
to study implications of these trends for countries excluded from
the process, yet located close to the EU. In this paper, we examine
the case of Ukraine as one such country. This former Soviet Union
republic, now a country of approximately 46 million people with
area exceeding that of France, presents an interesting case for
several reasons. First, Ukraine has rather close business ties to the
EU. In fact, in 2006 the value of Ukraine’s exports to the EU
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Second, recent (from Spring of 2005) abolition of visa requirement
for EU citizens visiting Ukraine
1 sparked interest in the country
as the tourist destination. From 2004 to 2006, Ukraine has seen
over 20 per cent increase in the number of foreigners visiting the
country (according to the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine).
According to the EU, 1.5 million passengers travelled by air
between Ukraine and the European Union in 2004, representing
25 per cent increase from 2003. Comparing these numbers to the
total number of air passengers in Ukraine (as provided by the
State Statistical Committee of Ukraine), we can say that half of
passengers boarding the flight to/from Ukraine traveled to/from
an EU country. Third, as we will show in this paper, Ukrainian
airline companies have the potential of entering the dynamic
Europe-Asia market, provided the country’s carriers play their
cards right.
More broadly, this paper is about the strategies for national
airlines in the liberalising global airline industry. European
experience dramatically shows that liberalisation poses a
substantial challenge to the national airlines, which “flag carriers”
can successfully respond to. Generally, it appears that unless a
national airline can find its niche on the global market, it may
cease to exist. Doganis, (2001) devotes an entire chapter of his
book to elaborate this point. As a key to a national airline’s success
he suggests the strategy of ‘network size rationalisation’, which
usually implies focusing on profitable routes and abandoning
unprofitable ones.
We  use example of Ukraine to take this point further to
suggest that network development is the key to a national airline’s
survival on the globally competitive market. Case of Ukraine is
unusual, as this country has two airlines which can be called ‘flag
carriers’ and compete on domestic routes, but not on international
ones. We consider this case to propose strategies which can be
employed by formerly protected airlines to meet challenges of
deregulation, as well as the related policy options to be pursued
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1 This also applied to citizens of Switzerland, Norway, Japan, US, and Canada.by the regulators. Namely, since international networks of
Ukraine’s two major carriers do not overlap, while domestic routes
do, we suggest that a code-sharing agreement involving only
international flights of the two carriers, but excluding domestic
routes, will have little if any anti-competitive effect, and can help
both airlines establish a strong competitive position on routes
from Europe and North America to Asia, using Kiev’s Boryspil
airport as a hub for channeling passengers. At the same time,
competition on the domestic markets will not decrease.
The following more general conclusions follow from our
analysis. First, where several protected national carriers are
present in the regulated environment, it is likely that following the
deregulation some cooperation will be required between them;
further, consolidation in such a case appears a more favorable
policy options than a merger. Second, in cases where regulators
are concerned that a single national airline obtains too much
market power on international routes, splitting the carrier into
two with a code-sharing agreement between them could be
considered a viable policy option, especially for national carriers
believed to be inefficiently large. Generally, we point out to the
possibility of using airline partnerships as a policy option, when
dealing with the national airlines.
A conclusion more closely related to the European Union is
that some of the EU airlines’ competitors on the EU-Asia airline
markets are located east of the EU. How strong those competitors
will be is going to depend on how regulated the market between
the EU and the respective country is, as well as on the strategies
pursued by the countries’ airlines.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
describes Ukrainian airline industry, with the emphasis on the
country’s two most advanced carriers. Section 3 makes the case
for Ukrainian airlines’ possible role on the EU-Asia market, and
outlines major problems to be solved by the carriers before this
goal can be reached. Section 4 compares two possible strategies
Ukrainian carriers can implement to facilitate obtaining the
market niche dictated by the country’s geographical position.
Section 5 concludes.
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632. - Ukraine’s Airline Companies
2.1 Background
Following break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine, a
country of about 46 million
2 people, inherited a number of decent
airports, a well-developed railroad network, and a fleet of outdated
Soviet airplanes
3. Ukrainian railroad network coupled with the low
per capita income hindered development of the domestic airline
market throughout the 1990s, and is partly responsible for the fact
that most international routes out of the country originate at Kiev’s
Borispol (KBP) airport. The country’s economy is developing
rather asymmetrically, with Kiev — the capital city of almost 3
million — growing faster than most regions. In addition to that,
most of Ukraine’s major cities are a half-day or one-night train
ride from Kiev, and fares are low (rarely more than $30 one-way
for standard class); Kiev is connected with all major Ukrainian
cities by one or several daily train services. 
Noticeable development of the domestic airline market started
around 2000, when Ukraine finally showed economic growth after
almost a decade of decline. The domestic market is rather
deregulated; nevertheless, the government of Ukraine still can have
profound influence on it
4. 
The number of passengers using air transport (both domest-
ically and internationally) is reported to have quadrupled from the
year 2000 (when about 1.1 million people travelled by air) to 2006
(4.4 million passengers). The biggest jump in air travel occurred
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2 This is the most recent officially released figure for the population of Ukraine.
In 1991 the population of Ukraine was 52 million people.
3 The only Soviet Union’s airline company was Aeroflot. The company used
Soviet-made aircraft. The airline’s passenger fleet consisted of Antonov turboprops,
as well as Ilyushyn, Tupolev and Yakovlev jets. The network was largely point-to-
point.
4 For example, in the Summer of 2002 the government decided to conduct an
‘experiment’ on the domestic market. It “offered” the domestic airlines to expand
capacity, increase frequency and slash fares on all domestic routes. The
‘experiment’ lasted for three months and the government claimed that it has
boosted air travel within Ukraine (some local experts claimed otherwise). Whether
this is indeed so is an interesting question, but the data necessary to conduct such
an investigation are out of reach.from 2003 to 2004, when the number of passengers went up by
about 0.9 million, or an astounding 40 per cent. All the numbers
presented here are as reported by the State Statistical Committee
of Ukraine. The reliability of this data is uncertain: for example,
Kiev’s Boryspil airport (KBP) states on its web site that it handled
over 3.9 million passengers in 2005; whereas the officially reported
number of air passengers for Ukraine over the same year is 3.8
million. Whatever the exact numbers, however, the growth over
the last six years has been substantial.
2.2 Three-Tier System
Technically, around 30 airline companies offer passenger
service within Ukraine, with a number of those performing charter
and scheduled international services. Majority of flights within
Ukraine are still operated using the Soviet era aircraft (mostly
Antonov turboprops and Yakovlev jets). There is also a seasonal
market for international charter services to major tourist
destinations (mostly in Turkey and Egypt), in which carriers from
all three tiers participate.
If we try to classify Ukrainian airline companies, a three-tier
system seems the most appropriate vision. At the lower tier, we
have companies relying mostly on domestic and/or seasonal
charter flights, with limited international services. The fleet of
these airlines normally consists of few rather old airplanes. A good
example of an airline at this tier is state-owned Lviv Airlines, based
in the city of Lviv in western Ukraine. This carrier offers scheduled
flights to Kiev and Moscow (daily), as well as sporadic services to
Rome, Madrid, Lisbon, and Naples, using its fleet of Antonov-24
turboprop and Yakovlev-42 jet aircraft
5.
At the second tier we have three carriers (Ukrainian
Mediterranean Airlines or UMAir; Donbassaero and Dniproavia)
which, while still relying on charter services to a significant degree
(e.g., 60 per cent of UMAir’s flights are charter services, according
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5 According to the airline’s web-site (www.avia.lviv.ua), over the period from
October 2006 till March 2007 the carrier performed 18 flights to Rome; 8 services
to Madrid; 6 to Lisbon; and 15 to Naples.to the airline), also offer scheduled international services to a
number of destinations. These services are, however, infrequent.
While at this second tier we observe airlines using Boeing and
Airbus aircraft, along with more than once-a-week scheduled
services to EU countries; it is also true that on-line booking is
rarely available (only offered by Donbassaero), and electronic
tickets are unheard of
6.
The top-tier Ukrainian carriers, which clearly stand out from
the rest are Ukraine International Airlines (PS) and Aerosvit
Ukrainian Airlines (VV), both based in Kiev, the capital of Ukraine.
These airlines can be called Ukraine’s “flag carriers”, and use
Boeing aircraft for their international flights
7. As of April 2007,
Ukraine International’s fleet consisted of fourteen Boeing 737
aircraft (with 15
th to be delivered shortly). Aerosvit at the same
time had eleven Boeing 737 planes and three wide-body 767-300
series airliners (previously flown by SAS and Mexicana); and it
aims to double the narrow-body and triple the wide-body fleet
over the next five years. Aerosvit will also be the main tenant of
the new terminal at Kiev’s Boryspil airport (scheduled to be
opened in 2009). These airlines offer the kind of services one is
accustomed to with major carriers from Europe, North America,
or Southeast Asia, including on-line booking, electronic tickets (on
a growing number of routes), frequent flier programs, on-line
flight and luggage tracking.
Ukraine International is 61 percent owned by the Ukrainian
government, with Austrian Airlines holding 22 percent, and EBRD
- 10 percent of the airline. Aerosvit is 38 percent owned by a Dutch
Company, Gilward Investments B.V. (rumored to be linked to
Russian business interests
8), with Ukrainian government holding
22.5 percent of the company; the remaining part of the airline is
owned by several Ukrainian entities.
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6 Even though you will be able to purchase the ticket on Donbassaero’s web-
site, you will still need to pick up the paper ticket at either the airline’s office or
the airport (delivery by mail is not offered).
7 Soviet made Antonov-24 turboprops and Yakovlev-40 jets are used for some
of the carriers’ domestic services; yet, they too are being replaced with B-737 jets.
8 Search on the internet revealed no web site or physical address for this
investment company.The carriers are modestly profitable: Ukraine International
finished year 2006 with $2.2 million operating profit on $198
million revenue, marking seventh straight profitable year for the
carrier; whereas Aerosvit made $0.5 million on similar revenue.
Both airlines made less in absolute terms in 2006 than they did
in 2005 (and given that their revenue increased sharply due to
expansion, their margins fell dramatically), a fact the carriers
themselves attribute to the rising fuel cost.
These airlines are members of IATA but not of the European
Association of Airlines. Also, neither PS nor VV is affiliated with
any of the three major international airline alliances. Ukraine
International Airlines, however, has a rather strong partnership
with Austrian Airlines (which is not surprising given that Austrian
owns part of UIA), and cooperates with members of the Skyteam
alliance - UIA’s flights to Amsterdam, Paris and Milan are included
into KLM’s, Air France’s and Alitalia’s schedules, respectively.
Ukraine International uses its morning services on these routes
to feed traffic to European carriers’ transatlantic and other
services. 
2.3 Operations of Top-Tier Airlines 
International operations of the two largest Ukrainian carriers
have the following peculiarities. First, international routes to/from
Ukraine are still subject to regulation by restrictive inter-govern-
mental bilateral agreements. Some progress towards liberalisation
has been made in late 2005, when a new aviation treaty was signed
between EU and Ukraine; however, the only major change that
agreement brought about was removal of the nationality clause
from bilateral agreements between Ukraine and individual EU
member states. Thus, “traditional” entry barriers (i.e., specifying
the number of carriers that can be designated to perform services
between the two countries, frequency of such services, airports
to/from which scheduled flights are permitted) remain agreement-
specific and intact. In fact, Ukraine does not have an “open-skies”
type of treaty with any country. Thus, the structure we currently
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Ukrainian and respective foreign governments. Sometimes this
bargaining turns into “trade wars”. For instance, Lufthansa’s
attempt to launch a second daily non-stop flight between Munich
and Kiev in the Fall of 2004 led to suspension of almost all air
services between Ukraine and Germany for several months
9.
The second notable fact is that the two flag carriers do not
directly compete on any international route out of Ukraine, as far
as scheduled services are concerned. Ukraine International flies
mostly to Western Europe and the Middle East, while Aerosvit’s
services are to Eastern European, North American (services to
New York and Toronto) and Asian (flights to New Delhi, Bangkok,
Beijing and Shanghai) countries. In total, PS and VV combined
offer scheduled services to over thirty destinations outside of
Ukraine, and link Kiev to at least eight major Ukrainian cities.
The two carriers may compete on the routes where they offer
seasonal charter operations, but these are not of much interest to
us, as such flights are sold predominantly as part of the air-hotel
packages and not as separate products.
As of summer of 2007, thirteen EU airlines — all of them
former “flag carriers” — offer scheduled non-stop services to
Ukraine (compared to seventeen EU countries serviced by the top
two Ukrainian carriers), concentrating mostly on flights to the
country’s capital. A small seasonal charter market to Crimea
peninsula appeared recently, as EU citizens are no longer required
to have visas for short-term visits to Ukraine. Even though the
new EU – Ukraine aviation treaty (signed in December 2005)
effectively removes the nationality clause, so that any EU airline
can fly from any EU country to Ukraine; no carrier has used this
right up to now. As mentioned above, EU airlines do not go much
beyond offering flights to Ukraine’s capital city. Only four EU’s flag
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9 The air services agreement between the two countries capped the frequency
of flights that can be offered by airlines of either Ukraine or Germany on any
given city-pair market between the two countries at seven per week. Lufthansa’s
decision was in violation of that clause, and subsequent “negotiations” led to
suspension of all scheduled services between the countries except for those on
Frankfurt-Kiev route. Following re-negotiation of the treaty, Lufthansa was allowed
to open its second daily Munich-Kiev service.carriers offer services on more than one route between their
respective country and Ukraine. These carriers are:
— Lufthansa (which flies to Kiev from Frankfurt, Munich and
Düsseldorf, also offering flights to Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk); 
— LOT Polish Airlines (with flights from Warsaw to Kiev, Lviv
and Odessa); 
— Malev Hungarian Airlines (flying to Kiev and Odessa); 
— Austrian Airlines (offering flights to Kiev, Kharkiv, Lviv,
Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, and Odessa). As mentioned above, this
carrier also owns a chunk of Ukraine International Airlines – this
presumably facilitated Austrian Airlines’ expansion on Ukrainian
market. 
So, most EU carriers do not appear to exhibit substantial
interest in Ukrainian market at this point. One can suggest that
this is dictated by restrictive regulation on the market; however,
Lufthansa’s and Austrian Airlines’ presence on a good number of
routes suggests it is only the matter of willingness to negotiate.
3. - Possibilities and Problems
3.1 EU - Asia Niche
Geographical position of Ukrainian airports (especially of
Kiev’s Borispol airport) allows establishment of a hub for
routing passengers on lucrative routes from Europe and North
America to Asia. Yet, competition on those markets is likely to
be keen. A good number of services are offered between the
EU states and the main Asian countries (Japan, South Korea,
China, India), by both European and Asian carriers. Besides
Ukrainian carriers, Aeroflot Russian Airlines
10 and Turkish
Airlines are also interested in establishing their position on this
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10 Aeroflot has had a strong position on Europe-Asia market during the Soviet
times, when competitors were not even granted the first freedom right (the right
to fly over USSR territory without stopping) for their services to Asia. After demise
of the Soviet Union, an agreement was reached whereby European and Asian
carriers pay the Russian government for the right to fly over Russia in connection
with the Europe-Asia flights.market niche. One can indeed travel to Asia through Kiev,
Moscow, or Istanbul from either Western or Eastern Europe
without much loss in terms of distance and (subject to clever
schedule coordination) travel time. The questions of the day
are whether Ukrainian carriers should compete for this niche
and what they should do to succeed. These issues will become
increasingly important as pressure builds up for allowing
competition on the international routes out of Ukraine. While
entering the EU is a rather distant alternative, the possibility
of facing competition not only from the ‘traditional’ airlines,
but also from the European low-cost carriers may not be that
distant, as example of Russia shows (a number of European
low-cost carriers offer services to Moscow).
Thus, the strategies Ukrainian carriers will pursue now will
determine whether the country’s national carriers will disappear
or thrive. As an example of a successful capitalization on the hub
airport’s position, we can consider the case of Iberia, which
managed to turn Madrid’s airport into the hub for Europe - South
America air traffic. Also, a careful examination of the case of
Ukraine should allow us to suggest strategies and policy options
for other national carriers in the deregulated environment.
The answer to the first question we asked above is trivial. If
Ukrainian carriers fail to take the niche “dictated” by the
geographical position of KBP, there will be no place for them on
the truly global and competitive market. Historically, metropolitan
areas of the size of Kiev have become hubs of certain carriers.
Examples from the US market include Phoenix, Dallas — Forth
Worth, Minneapolis — St. Paul, Miami. Ukrainian carriers could
still bet on generating sufficient traffic within Ukraine (which can
also be routed through Kiev) to remain internationally competitive.
Such strategy will be feasible in the regulated environment like
the one currently observed, and could be probable in a partially
deregulated environment, where foreign carriers are excluded from
Ukraine’s domestic market (a framework of a typical “open-skies”
agreement). However, even in the partially deregulated setting
Ukraine’s airlines will feel fiercer competition from the other
countries’ carriers, as the latter may choose to offer non-stop
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11. There is always an option
for Ukrainian carriers to simply feed passengers to other airlines;
but in a completely deregulated environment such carriers are
absorbed by the stronger competitors.
3.2 Problems 
Before we further develop the issue we raised above, it is
necessary to mention the well-known concept of ‘economies of
traffic density’, which is crucial to understanding the benefits of
the hub-and-spoke system. An airline can increase its output by
expanding the network and/or increasing traffic on the current
network. When talking about economies of traffic density, we refer
to a situation where airline’s average cost of carrying a passenger
decrease with increased traffic, holding network size constant. This
means that under economies of traffic density it makes sense for
an airline to fill up the airplane. Several studies (e.g., Brueckner -
Dyer - Spiller 1992; Brueckner - Spiller 1994) empirically confirmed
economies of traffic density in the airline industry. A well-developed
hub-and-spoke network allows bringing passengers from many
destinations for a connecting flight at the hub airport, increasing
the load factor and allowing the carrier to use economies of traffic
density to fuller extent.
We  claim that the current network structure, offered by
Ukrainian carriers, will not allow them to establish a strong position
on the Europe - Asia and North America - Asia markets. Demand
on Europe - Ukraine, North America - Ukraine or Asia - Ukraine
markets alone will be insufficient to ensure high load factors on a
comprehensive network (there are some routes where this is
achievable, either year-round or seasonally, though). Thus, travelers
on Asia - Europe and Asia - North America routes must be added,
and as many of those as possible. Yet, we mentioned above that
Aerosvit and Ukraine International do not offer overlapping
Issues in Network Development, etc. V. BILOTKACH
71
11 Besides Kiev, Ukraine has four cities with population of over 1 million people
(Kharkiv, Donetsk, Odessa, and Dnipropetrivsk), which could become very
attractive entry targets for foreign carriers.networks outside of Ukraine, and Aerosvit appears to be the only
airline attempting to use Kiev as a hub for travel between Europe/
North America and Asia. This means that Aerosvit is effectively
unable to channel passengers from Western Europe to its services
to Asia through Kiev, leaving the most profitable segment of the
market out of reach. Also, Ukraine International is not able to take
advantage of potentially higher load factors it could achieve with
passengers from Aerosvit’s Asian services. Thus, Ukraine Internat-
ional currently relies on either substantial number of Ukrainians
abroad (e.g., services to Lisbon, Madrid, Rome), or on feeding
passengers to hubs of other carriers (Amsterdam, Zurich, Vienna)
for filling its planes.
4. - Strategies and Policy Options
4.1 Single Carrier
Previous sub-section suggests an obvious conclusion. If
Ukraine’s airlines want to establish a strong position on the Europe-
Asia and North America-Asia markets, they need to coordinate their
efforts in some way. The first solution that comes to mind is a
merger of the two companies. Indeed, such an option has been
entertained by the Ukrainian government. From the point of view
of competition policy, however, such a merger will create two
problems. First, it will increase market share of the new single
carrier at Kiev Boryspil airport. This brings up the issue of the
airport dominance effect. Several studies (Borenstein, 1989; Evans
- Kessides, 1993; Berry - Carnall - Spiller, 1996; Lee - Luengo-Prado,
2005) have shown that airport dominance is a source of market
power on the US airline market. Bilotkach (2007a) found airport
dominance effect applies to the transatlantic routes. In our case
this means that fares for travel to/from Kiev may increase, even
though competition on separate Kiev - Europe routes will not
decrease. The second problem of such a merger is that it will
decrease competition on Ukraine’s domestic market. While
economies of traffic density can work to mitigate the negative
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increase implying lower per passenger cost), there is still a strong
possibility that a merger between the two Ukrainian carriers may
not be a good policy option.
4.2 Limited Partnership
We  can look at another process currently affecting the
international airline industry to suggest a form of cooperation
between PS and VV, which (as related evidence suggests) will not
be counter-competitive. Over the last fifteen years airlines have
been consolidating their services. Such consolidation takes many
forms, the most notable of which are code-sharing agreements and
alliances. Code-sharing involves joining the partner airlines’
networks
12, allowing carriers to jointly market each others’ flights.
Several studies (Brueckner, 2001; Brueckner - Whalen, 2000;
Bilotkach, 2005, 2007b) have shown that such partnerships
decrease fares for interline trips (itineraries requiring change of
carrier en route). The intuition for this is that without coordinat-
ion between carriers and with product complementarity, double
marginalization results. When two airlines providing such
complementary services coordinate their actions, the resulting fare
for the interline trip will be lower than without coordination. 
We suggest the following structure of a code-sharing agreement
between Ukraine International and Aerosvit. Only international
flights of the carriers must be included into the united network.
This way, for example, Ukraine International will be able to pick
up Aerosvit’s passengers from Asia for its flights to Western Europe.
Thus, the network of both carriers will be enlarged. Such an
alliance will not be counter-competitive for the following reasons.
First, the two carriers do not directly compete on any of the
international routes, meaning that competition on those markets
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12 A typical code-sharing agreement between airlines A and B involves inclusion
of flights, serviced by airline A, into the airline B’s schedule, and vice versa. This
way, each partner airline effectively expands its network without servicing
additional flights.will not be reduced. Second, without a merger there is less chance
of price increases due to the airport dominance effect, as discussed
above. We must also stress that domestic flights of the two
Ukrainian airline companies must be excluded from the proposed
alliance, as otherwise we will end up with lower competition within
Ukraine (PS and VV do compete on a number of domestic routes).
In summary, the proposed consolidation will not be counter-
competitive and will help Ukrainian carriers establish a solid
position on the Europe-Asia and North America-Asia markets.
Other issue related to such a limited partnership is potential
competition. Garcia-Gallego - Georgantzis - Gil-Molto - Orts (2006)
suggest that an adverse effect of a code-sharing agreement may
be that the partner airlines might choose not to enter the routes
serviced by their partners, which they would have entered absent
this agreement. This means, for example, that whereas Aerosvit
might have considered entering Kiev-London market absent an
agreement with UIA, it may abandon its plans once the
partnership between the two Ukrainian carriers is in place. Such
an effect will have potentially the most severe consequences for
routes that are currently served by a single Ukrainian carrier,
where such does not face competition with the foreign airline
(such as Kiev-Barcelona or Kiev-Madrid markets). Such routes are,
however, few, and entry by foreign carriers will most probably not
be precluded by a code-sharing agreement between the two
Ukrainian airlines, even where such may preclude entry by the
second Ukrainian carrier. 
One can also become skeptical as to whether the partnership
we propose is better than that between, for example, Aerosvit and
EU companies offering non-stop flights to Kiev. This way, EU
airlines will feed traffic to Aerosvit’s services to Asia, and VV will
feed passengers to European carriers’ service to their respective
countries (from both Asia and Ukraine). Such a partnership may
or may not be beneficial to our hypothetical European carrier. On
one hand, if the EU airline also offers a non-stop service to the
Asian city where Aerosvit flies, the partnership will both create a
competitor for the EU carrier and lower the load factor on the
non-stop flight (thereby increasing per passenger cost). On the
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passengers between non-stop (which will cater to customers with
higher value of time) and one-stop services, and engaging in good
old price discrimination.
Another aspect of the partnership between a European and a
Ukrainian carrier versus that between the two Ukrainian airlines
is that in the former case the alliance will be clearly
complementary, whereas in the latter we will talk about a semi-
complementary partnership, as far as travel between Ukraine and
Europe is concerned. Take Donetsk-Paris market, with service via
Kiev. Currently the only Ukrainian airline capable of offering the
single-airline service on this route is Ukraine International
Airlines
13. At the same time, Aerosvit offers Donetsk-Kiev flights;
and Air France flies between Paris and Kiev. The two partnerships
we can consider on this route are Ukraine International - Aerosvit
and Air France - Aerosvit. In the former case, both Ukraine
International and Aerosvit will feed traffic to UIA’s Kiev-Paris
service, so UIA will effectively compete against itself; whereas in
the latter case UIA will compete with Air France-Aerosvit service.
Welfare properties of such partnerships are compared in Bilotkach
(2007c). This study finds that the semi-complementary alliance
can dominate if economies of traffic density are strong. We should
add, however, that a network-wide partnership between UIA and
Aerosvit should be easier to setup than a series of agreements
between Ukrainian and European carriers.
For the proposed partnership between the two Ukrainian
airline companies to be successful, the carriers must implement
several adjustments in other dimensions of their services. First of
all, coordination of schedules will be required. Passengers can be
easily distracted from flying through Kiev if they have to wait for
ten-fifteen hours between the flights. Second, the key to success
of an airline is in being able to attract frequent business travellers.
And an important factor in attracting such customers is frequency
of flights. This issue may prove problematic for the Ukrainian
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13 One can also travel via Vienna with Austrian Airlines or via Munich with
Lufthansa.carriers; yet, there are visible improvements in this area. For
example, UIA now provides several flights a day to several
destinations (Amsterdam, Vienna) - something unheard of a couple
of years ago. Aerosvit’s flights to Asia and North America are still
infrequent (which is to be expected, if you try to service fours
Asian - Bangkok, Beijing, Shanghai and New Delhi, and two North
American - New York and Toronto - cities with only three
airplanes). This schedule will not attract frequent price-insensitive
travellers. Moreover, such customers usually tend to stick with a
single airline, even though this may mean higher ticket prices; this
is reinforced by the frequent-flier programs, offering rewards for
brand loyalty. Frequent flier programs also seem more attractive
the larger the network over which miles can be collected and
redeemed. That is why all serious alliances involve joining of the
partner airlines’ frequent flier programs. We too can suggest that
Ukrainian carriers consolidate their services with other major
airlines, including joining the frequent flier programs with world’s
biggest airlines. This strategy has both benefits (makes services of
Ukrainian carriers more attractive for partner airlines’ frequent
customers) and costs (if passengers who have earned miles on
partner airline redeem it on Ukrainian carriers’ flights).
5. - Beyond Ukraine
Let us generalize the discussion, offered in the previous
section, to suggest guidelines for network development by the
national airline companies in the deregulated environment. The
first general (and a rather intuitive) conclusion that comes to mind
is that to be viable in the longer run a national carrier must try
to find its niche on the global airline market. This seems like a
very obvious point. Yet, sometimes this concept is hard to grasp
for companies that have enjoyed so much protection from
competition for so long. Successes (Lufthansa, British Airways,
Air France, KLM) and failures (Sabena, Swissair, Alitalia) of the
EU’s flag carriers is a good manifest to this point. 
The second related conclusion is that national carriers that
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spoke network. Moreover, establishing a network that only
channels passengers to/from the home country may not be
sufficient, especially where the country’s market is small and/or
competition from the surface transport is substantial. Thus, a
national carrier (especially from a small country) should strive to
establish a network, which channels passengers through the
country. An important conclusion that can stem from this is that
establishing a hub-and-spoke network will more likely require the
national carrier to expand - a strategy that can contradict the
“network size rationalization” as suggested by Doganis (2001).
Many European carriers (especially from the smaller countries)
have been “fortunate” in this respect, as their networks have
traditionally been of hub-and-spoke type. 
The third conclusion is that where several national carriers
exist, there is an alternative to a merger between them to make
their competitive position stronger. The carriers can consolidate
their operations through a code-sharing agreement to include non-
overlapping parts of their networks. This will effectively enlarge
the airlines’ networks without increasing market power due to
airport dominance, as is possible in case of merger between
several national carriers. An alternative interpretation of this
conclusion is that a single national airline can be split into several
carriers without loss in competitive position, so long as the
carriers’ services remain consolidated. One should, however, be
careful here to recognize that splitting one national carrier into
two or more will mean duplication of management and other
departments, so it appears that this option can only be applied to
very large carriers, which can be suspected of operating in the
decreasing-returns-to-scale part of their average cost curves.
Fourth, national carriers should strive to attract frequent
business customers, which will require increasing flight frequencies
and increasing network size (and/or entering into a partnership
with an airline with large network).
To  sum it up, following deregulation the airlines which
enjoyed the privileged status of national symbols for decades
found or will find themselves in a rather difficult position of
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EU airline industry provides an excellent natural experiment of
this phenomenon - better than the 1978 deregulation of the US
airline market. In the US, the airfares and the airlines’ networks
have been effectively fixed
14; yet, the carriers were free to compete
in terms of frequency and service quality. In the EU, however, pre-
liberalisation era was characterised by a network of bilateral
agreements effectively restricting international markets in all
dimensions. 
One should however understand that even though European
Union’s liberalised airline market ends at the Poland-Ukraine
border, the important Europe-Asia market stretches beyond it. And
important players on this market may also have their hub airports
east of Poland. With a good number of potential customers willing
to tolerate an inconvenience of a stop en route from Europe to
Asia for somewhat lower fare, and apparently limited ambitions
of airlines from the new EU members for getting involved with
this market; the established EU airlines will have to compete with
carriers from Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine. How strong those
competitors will be is going to depend both on how regulated the
market for air travel between the EU and the respective countries
is (it remains rather regulated so far); and what strategies those
countries’ airlines will implement. This paper has considered the
case of Ukrainian carriers in light of this issue.
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14 Even here, regulation related to the inter-state air travel, resulting in at least
two (California and Texas), deregulated markets.BIBLIOGRAPHY
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